TORTS-LIBEL-NEW JERSEY ADOPTS SINGLE PUBLICATION
RULE IN LIBEL ACTIONS-Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston,

Inc., 74 N.J. 461, 378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
During the summer of 1971, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., a
nationally recognized publishing house, completed preparation of the
manuscript for a book entitled No Cause For Indictment.' The pub2
lisher subsequently dispatched an order to an independent printer
and, "[p]ursuant to established trade practice," released the book to
the retail market on November 15, 1971. 3 Initial sales figures indicated a favorable public response, prompting the publisher to place
an order for additional copies. 4 In course of time, however, demand
for the book began to decline. 5 In answer to this diminution of
interest, the publisher effectuated a bulk sale of most of its remaining

1 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 375, 330 A.2d 38, 40-41
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). No Cause For Indictment examines the state of affairs in the City of
Newark during the violent civil disorders of 1967. Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant at
2-3, Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div.
1976) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant].
2 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 375, 330 A.2d 38, 41
(Law Div. 1974), affd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). The publisher's initial printing order was for 6,000 copies. 131 N.J.
Super. at 375, 330 A.2d at 41. An order was later sent which requested the binding of the 6,000
copies in hard cover. Id.
3 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 376, 330 A.2d 38, 41
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), affd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). In addition to releasing the book to the retail markets, the publisher
satisfied all orders submitted prior to the release date. 131 N.J. Super. at 376, 330 A.2d at 41.
4 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 376, 330 A.2d 38, 41
(Law Div. 1974), affd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
The events surrounding the printing and distribution of the book occurred in the following
chronological order: summer of 1971, publisher ordered 6,000 copies from the printer; October
19, 1971, publisher forwarded copies of the book to reviewers; November 15, 1971, publisher
released the book to the marketplace; January 21, 1972, publisher placed ads for the book in
local area newspapers; February, 1972, publisher ordered 2,500 additional copies; July, 1972,
publisher ordered hard covers removed from the 2,500 copies and the substitution of paper
covers; August, 1973, publisher sold the remaining hardcover inventory, totalling 1,857 copies,
to a remainder outlet; May 31, 1974, plaintiff filed his complaint charging publisher and author
with libel. 131 N.J. Super. at 374-76, 330 A.2d at 40-41. The publisher's stock consisted of
approximately 1,373 paperback copies at the time of trial. Id. at 376, 330 A.2d at 41. Since the
publisher no longer maintains an inventory of hardcover copies, orders for the book must be
satisfied with paperback copies from this stock. Id.
I Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 376, 330 A.2d 38, 41
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
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hard cover inventory, consisting of several hundred copies, to a remainder outlet in August of 1973.6
On May 31, 1974, Anthony Barres 7 commenced an action
charging both the author and the publisher with libel based on an
allegedly defamatory passage which had appeared in the book.8 Prior
to filing an answer, the publisher moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action. 9
This motion was predicated upon the publisher's assertion that any
cause of action Barres may have possessed was barred by the New
Jersey one year statute of limitations for libel actions.1 0 In response,
the plaintiff contended that his failure to initiate his suit within one
year of the general release date did not serve as a bar to all claims
since each individual sale of the allegedly libelous book created a new
cause of action."

I

Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 376, 330 A.2d 38, 41
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
7 Anthony Barres was a member of the Newark Police Department during the period subject to review in the book. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3. At the time of the
institution of the suit, he was the acting police director of the city. Id. at 2.
8 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 374, 330 A.2d 38, 40
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). The author of the book declined to file an answer or to make an appearance. 131 N.J. Super. at 374 n.1, 330 A.2d at 40 n.1, Following the author's default, a proof
hearing was conducted which resulted in a judgment awarding the plaintiff compensatory and
punitive damages. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 1.
I Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 374, 330 A.2d 38, 40
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). The publisher also contended that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 131 N.J. Super. at 374, 330 A.2d at 40. This claim was subsequently dropped at the
initial hearing on the motion. Id. at 374 n.1, 330 A.2d at 40 n.1.
'0 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 374, 330 A.2d 38, 40
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). The applicable statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952), provides:
"Every action at law for libel or slander shall be commenced within 1 year next after the
publication of the alleged libel or slander." Id.
Submitted with the motion was an affidavit of one of the publisher's officers which indicated that the book was released on November 15, 1971. 131 N.J. Super. at 374, 330 A.2d at
40. The publisher, therefore, contended the plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations on November 16, 1972. Id.
"l Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 374, 330 A.2d 38, 40
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976). aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). The plaintiff asserted that each sale of the allegedly libelous book constituted a "publication" within the meaning of the statute of limitations. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 4; see note 10 supra. The plaintiff further argued that it was improper to
raise the statute of limitations as a defense by means of the motion since no dates had been
stated in the complaint. 131 N.J. Super. at 374, 330 A.2d at 40.
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Addressing Barres' claim for damages, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the publisher,1 2 reasoning that the
plaintiff's suit was barred by the expiration of the statutory limitation
period. 13 In so holding, the trial court adopted "the single publication rule" under which the publication of a single edition of a libelous
4
book, newspaper or periodical generates but one cause of action.l
Consequently, while subsequent distributions of the libelous material
may increase the plaintiff's damages, they do not create additional
causes of action or start the running of a fresh statutory limitation
period. 15 The trial court further held that neither the printing of the
12 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 393, 330 A.2d 38, 51

(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). Noting that the plaintiff had been unable to engage in discovery, the trial
court treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment. 131 N.J. Super. at 375, 330
A.2d at 40. This approach was taken pursuant to N.J.R. 4:6-2 which provides in pertinent part:
Every defense, legal or equitable, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
complaint ... shall be asserted in the answer thereto, except that the following
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion, with briefs: . . . (e)
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ....
If, on a motion to
dismiss based on the defense numbered (e), iiatters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment . . . and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material pertinent to such a motion.
Id. As a result, for purposes of disposing of the motion, the court assumed the statements which
appeared in the book were libelous. 131 N.J. Super. at 377, 330 A.2d at 41; see Raskulinecz v.
Raskulinecz, 141 N.J. Super. 148, 154, 357 A.2d 330, 333 (Law Div. 1976) (movant bears the
burden of establishing his right to judgment and all doubt is resolved against him).
13 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 393-94, 330 A.2d 38, 51
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977). The court observed that due to the author's default, the plaintiff could
conceivably receive a judgment against him based on a finding that the book was libelous. 131
N.J. Super. at 391, 330 A.2d at 50. Aware that the publisher could continue to fill orders if the
statute of limitations was found to bar all claims against him, the court held that the partial
summary judgment was without prejudice to the plaintiff. Id. at 393-94, 330 A.2d at 51. This
holding enabled Barres to amend the complaint so as to include a claim for equitable relief
against the publisher in the event that the book was found to contain libelous statements. id.
Furthermore, the dismissal was without prejudice to the publisher since it permitted him to
submit an answer to the amended complaint. This answer could advance any defense, including
those directed to the issue of injunctive relief. Id. Absent such a holding, the court declared,
the plaintiff could acquire a judgment on the libelous book while the publisher could continue
to distribute the book at will. Id. at 394, 330 A.2d at 51-52. The plaintiff was subsequently
granted a default judgment against the author. In lieu of amending his complaint to include a
claim for equitable relief, the plaintiff appealed to the appellate division. Brief In Opposition To
Certification at 1, Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 74 N.J. 461, 378 A.2d 1148 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant-Respondent].
14 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 374-75, 330 A.2d 38, 40
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
15 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 375, 330 A.2d 38, 40
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
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additional copies nor the bulk sale of the publisher's surplus inventory to the remainder outlet served as a republication of the libelous
matter and, therefore, did not produce new causes of action.16
The appellate division, reviewing the trial court holding, affirmed
the utilization of the single publication rule for the reasons enumerated in the lower court opinion. 1 7 On certification, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.,l 8
endorsed, in a per curiam opinion, the reasoning of the lower courts
and formally adopted the single publication rule for libel actions. 19
Two Justices dissented, 20 asserting that the one year statute of limitations should not serve to bar a libel action where hundreds of copies
of a defamatory statement have been distributed by a publisher
2
within one year of the commencement of the suit. '
Historically, libel has been defined as the unprivileged publication of false and defamatory matter to a person other than the defamed. 22 Since the tort of libel is designed to protect the estimation
in which one's character is held by others, and not one's opinion of
himself, there can be no cause of action unless the defamatory material is brought to the attention of a third party. 23 The courts have

16 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 131 N.J. Super. 371, 390-91, 330 A.2d 38, 50
(Law Div. 1974), aff'd, 141 N.J. Super. 563, 359 A.2d 501 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461,
378 A.2d 1148 '(1977).
'7 Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 141 N.J. Super. 563, 564, 359 A.2d 501, 502
(App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 74 N.J. 461, 378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
"874 N.J. 461, 378 A.2d 1148 (1977).
19 Id. at 461, 378 A.2d at 1148.
20 Id. The dissenting opinion was authored by Justice Schreiber, with whom Chief Justice
Hughes joined. Further reference to the majority opinion is directed to the opinion of Judge
Dwyer of the superior court, law division, 131 N.J. Super. 371, 330 A.2d 38 (Law Div. 1974),
as adopted by the supreme court, while citation to the dissenting view refers to the opinion of
Justice Schreiber of the supreme court. 74 N.J. 461, 378 A.2d 1148 (1977).

21 74 N.J. at 461, 378 A.2d at 1148.
22 W. ODGERS & R. RITSON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 131 (6th ed.
1929); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 558-59 (1938). Libel has been defined as "any printed or
written defamation of a person, published maliciously and without justification." State v. Reade,
136 N.J.L. 432, 433, 56 A.2d 566, 566 (Sup. Ct. 1948). The law of defamation can be divided
into two distinct classes: (1) libel, which is generally written or printed and (2) slander, which is
a defamation communicated by the spoken word. Id. at 434, 56 A.2d at 567; see W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971).
21 Gnapinsky v. Goldyn, 23 N.J. 243, 252, 128 A.2d 697, 702 (1957). Observing that the law

of defamation attempts to protect an individual's reputation, the court concluded that the communication of defamatory matter to a third person was an essential element, without which
neither libel nor slander could be established. Id. at 252, 128 A.2d at 702; Chandless v. Borg,
24 N.J. Super. 73, 87, 93 A.2d 651, 658 (Law Div. 1952) (it is the "publication," and not simply
the printing of a libelous article, which gives rise to a cause of action). See W. PROSSER, supra
note 22, § 111, at 737; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 577, Comments a and b (1938).
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determined that "publication," a term of art in the law of libel, desig2 4
nates this essential act of communication.
At early common law, each individual communication of written
or printed material constituted a publication of any libel incorporated
therein. 2 5 Accordingly, each such communication gave rise to a
separate and distinct cause of action. 2 6 The courts initially declined
to distinguish between a single communication of a libel and one
made on a massive scale. 2 7 As a result, the courts concluded that
each sale and delivery of a libelous book or newspaper constituted a
publication, creating a separate cause of action upon which the defamed party could recover damages. 28 The principal case from which
this common law approach was drawn was Duke of Brunswick v.
Harmer.2 9 In that English case, the plaintiff brought an action based
upon a defamatory statement which appeared in an issue of a newspaper published by the defendant more than seventeen years prior to
the commencement of the action. 30 The plaintiff submitted evidence
which revealed that a single copy of the past issue had been purchased by a third party just prior to the filing of the complaint. 3 1 The
24 Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505, 505 (1931); W. ODGERS & R. RITSON,
supra note 22, at 131; W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 113, at 766.
In Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948), a case involving
an allegedly defamatory radio broadcast, the court stated that the publication of a defamation
occurs "when [a] charge, suggestion, insinuation, or representation is made, by the defendant,
in presence of a third person, either by intention or by negligence, or with reasonable ground
to suppose that it will become known to others." Id. at 701, 61 A.2d at 146-47 (quoting M.
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 287 (8th ed. 1907)). In order to constitute a valid publication,
the defendant's libelous statement must be understood by the third party. For example, the
communication of defamatory matter in a foreign language may not constitute a viable act of
publication, even though the statement was heard by the third party. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577, Comments c and d (1976).
25 See Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 117 Eng. Rep. 75, 77 (Q.B. 1849). The Restatement
of Torts provides that
(e]ach time a libelous article is brought to the attention of a third person, a new
publication has occurred, and each publication is a separate tort. Thus, each time a
libelous book or paper or magazine is sold, a new publication has taken place
which, if the libel is false and unprivileged, will support a separate action for damages against the seller. So too, each time a libelous article is reprinted or redistributed, a new publication is made and a fresh tort is committed.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 578, Comment b (1938).

26 W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 113, at 769; see note 25 supra.
27 See Note, The Single Publication-Which One?, 44 TEMP. L. Q. 400, 400 (1971).
28 Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736, 738 (W.D. Wis. 1947), aff'd, 171
F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1948); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Stpp. 24, 32 (E.D. Wash.
1943), appeal dismissed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944).
29 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (Q.B. 1849).
30 Id. at 75.
31 Id. at 76. The Duke of Brunswick had directed an individual to obtain a copy of the
newspaper from the defendant, Harmer. Id. In the ensuing action for libel, the defendant
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court, in rejecting the defendant's contention that the statute of limitations barred the action, held that each communication of the libel
gave rise to a new cause of action. 32 This principle eventually came
to be known as the multiple publication rule. 33 Pursuant to this
rule, the statute of limitations commences to run on each action from
34
the date of the communication which qualifies as the publication.
Although this common law rule went unchallenged as the definitive rule of law for nearly a century,3 5 the American courts ultimately
came to realize that the multiple publication standard was incapable
of fulfilling the needs of a modern, technologically advanced society
with massive printing and distribution demands. 36 In justifying their
rejection of the multiple publication rule, the courts have recognized
that contemporary methods of disseminating printed materials are
vastly superior to those prevailing during the development of the
rule.3 7 The potential consequences of the multiple publication rule,
when applied to present day controversies, has led one court to declare that the maxim which mandates that every communication be
asserted that a sale to a person sent by the plaintiff to acquire a copy of the newspaper for the
plaintiff's use should be considered a sale to the plaintiff himself. Id. Such a determination
would have resulted in the absence of a publication upon which a civil action for damages could
be founded. Id.; see note 22 supra. The court, however, accepted the plaintiff's contention that
the sale of a single copy of the newspaper to the plaintiff's agent was a suffcient publication of
the defamation so as to support an action for libel. 117 Eng. Rep. at 77.
32 See id. at 76-77. The applicable period of limitations in Duke of Brunswick was six years.
Id. at 75.
33 Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 405, 512 P.2d 702, 704 (1973).
14 117 Eng. Rep. at 76.
Leflar, The Single Publication Rule, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV, 263, 263 (1953).
36 See, e.g., Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1963); Ogden
v. Association of United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1959); Gregoire v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 123, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1948).
While rejecting the common law rule, the Zuck court observed that
[t]hese traditional principles [-the multiple publication rule-] antedate mass
publication and nationwide distribution of printed information by our modern processes. When applied to a contemporary magazine of wide circulation, for example,
they create the possibility that a single defamatory statement will give rise to millions of causes of action, one for each person who reads the offending periodical.
317 F.2d at 729.
37 Ogden v. Association of United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1959). In
1953, a noted commentator stated that the application of the multiple publication rule to contemporary publications would be "potentially disastrous" in light of the fact that leading periodicals had achieved circulations of some four million readers. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51
MICH. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (1953). One need only imagine the effect of a strict application of
the rule to a libel appearing in a magazine such as the Reader's Digest, which had a total
circulation of well over eighteen million copies in 1977. AYER DIRECTORY OF PUBLICATIONS
1074 (Ayer Press 1978). In addition, a large metropolitan newspaper, such as the New York
Daily News, can have a daily circulation of nearly two million copies and a Sunday circulation of
approximately three million. 59 STANDARD RATE & DATA SERVICE NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION
ANALYSIS 10-14 (Aug. 1977).
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considered as a separate publication "may seem logical from a purely
technical standpoint, but [that] to adhere to this doctrine would be to
sacrifice reality to strict technical logic." '
One discomforting characteristic of the multiple publication rule
is that it enables a libeled plaintiff to harass a publisher with a multiplicity of actions since a party who feels he has been defamed can
institute an action for each and every reader of the material.3 9 The
courts have frequently expressed their dissatisfaction with the possibility of having to entertain the overwhelming number of suits that
can result from the publication of a single libelous statement in a
contemporary magazine with a nationwide circulation. 4 0 Recognizing
this defect in a strict application of the multiple publication rule, the
courts constructed a "rule of convenience" 4 1 which required a person
aggrieved by a defamatory writing to incorporate in his action all
publications of the same libel made prior to the commencement of
the suit. 42 Although failure to include a defamatory publication released prior to the institution of the suit would serve to bar any action on that material, the courts did permit a plaintiff to bring a new
action for a republication of the libelous material made after the
43
commencement of the original suit.
This early rule of compulsory joinder did not, however, alleviate
the most serious flaw in the multiple publication rule. Of considerable concern to the judiciary has been the potentially frustrating effect this rule has on the policies underlying the statute of limitations.
The period within which a suit for libel must be commenced is cus38
39

Ogden v. Association of United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1959).
Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir. 1963); see 44 CALIF. L.

REV. 146, 147-48 (1956).
40 See, e.g., Dominiak v. National Enquirer, 439 Pa. 222, 225, 266 A.2d 626, 628 (1970);
Applewhite v. Memphis State Univ., 495 S.W.2d 190, 193-94 (Tenn. 1973).
41 Note, A "One Publication" Rule for Books, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 453, 455 (1949). The
creation of this rule of convenience preceded the formulation of the modern single publication

rule. Leflar, supra note 35, at 267-68.
42 Galligan v. Sun Printing and Publishing Ass'n, 25 Misc. 355, 358, 54 N.Y.S. 471, 473-74
(Sup. Ct. 1898). The use of this rule was evident in Galligan where the court concluded that
[i]f the article in question, which is libelous per se, had been published after the
commencement of the first action, a second action would have been clearly maintainable; but where a libelous article is republished before the commencement of an
action a separate action cannot be maintained on such republication.

Id.

at 358, 54 N.Y.S. at 473-74.

Another development, again resulting from the need to facilitate the application of the libel
laws, allowed a plaintiff to set forth a simple allegation that the libelous material had been
printed and widely circulated. See Johnston v. MacFadden Newspapers Corp., 238 App. Div.
68, 70-71, 263 N.Y.S. 561, 564 (1933).
43 Galligan v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 25 Misc. 355, 358, 54 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (Sup.
Ct. 1898); see note 42 supra.
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tomarily brief, 44 thereby "evidenc[ing] a public policy favoring early
trial . . . for a type of tort action that is peculiarly volatile and transient because the interest protected is the intangible and changeable
thing called personal reputation." 4 5 As illustrated in Duke of
Brunswick,4 6 the multiple publication rule enables, if not invites, the
plaintiff to thwart the purposes of the statute of limitations. In light of
the objectives of these statutes, namely to shelter the courts from the
litigation of time-worn claims and to insure the defendant a just opportunity to formulate an adequate defense, the courts could not be
content with a procedural standard which eliminated multiplicity of
suits but allowed the subversion of the statute of limitations.4 7
In response to the dilemmas of multiplicity of suits and the
endless tolling of the statute of limitations, both of which were aggravated by the development of publishing techniques, the courts formulated the single publication rule.4 8 This rule redefines the publication component of a cause of action for libel by designating the
entire process of news dissemination, including the acts of composing
and circulating the matter, as a single act of publication. 4 9 Pursuant
44 Statutes of limitations for libel actions normally do not exceed two years. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-3 (West 1952) (one year); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 215 (McKinney 1972)
(one year); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 31 (Purdon 1953 & 1978 Cum. Supp.) (one year). But see

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (3)(o) (West Supp. 1978) (four years). See also Leflar, supra note 35,
at 265.

4' Leflar, supra note 35, at 265. The period of limitations for defamation actions is justifiably
brief since the very nature of the tort requires immediate indemnification in order for the
remedy to be meaningful. Id. This view is due to the conviction that libelous statements exert
their strongest influence soon after their publication. See id.
" See 117 Eng. Rep. at 76-77.
41 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (statutes of limitations are
indispensable in that they serve as "devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims,
and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or
disappeared, and evidence has been lost"); Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J.
111, 115, 299 A.2d 394, 396 (1973) ("[s]tatutes of limitations are designed to stimulate litigants
to pursue their causes of action diligently and . . . [to] serve as measures of repose"); see note
79 infra.
48 Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 I11.App. 59, 61-64, 78 N.E.2d 708, 708-10 (1948).
The single publication rule originated in cases dealing with either venue or the statute of
limitations. See, e.g., Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921)
(venue); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 I11.App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1948) (statute of limitations);
Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) (venue); Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1908) (venue); Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948) (statute of limitations); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938), aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d
676 (1939) (statute of limitations). For a discussion of the employment of the single publication
rule in the context of venue, see Note, The Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1046-49 (1949).
" Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 I11.App. 59, 61, 78 N.E.2d 708, 709 (1948); 59 HARv. L. REV.
136, 136 (1945); see Note, Statute of Limitations under Uniform Single Publication Act Runs
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to this standard, any single integrated unit, such as an edition of a
book or an issue of a periodical, produces a single publication which
can support only one cause of action. 50 While the rule continues to
permit the plaintiff to introduce evidence as to the extent of circulation and the area within which distribution occurred in order to enable the court to accurately ascertain the degree of injury, 5 1 the
specific number of copies distributed bears only upon the amount of
52
damages and not upon the number of actions the plaintiff may bring.
Under the single publication rule, the distribution of copies of a new
printing, or of a new edition of a libelous book, is viewed as an independent act of publication which generates a separate cause of action. 5 3 The courts which have adhered to this rule have determined
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the single
publication. 54
from Date of Any Publication Defamed Person Chooses as Representing Cause of Action, 39
FORDHAM L. REv. 332, 333-34 (1970).
50 Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1963); Gregoire v.
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 123, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1948); see W. PROSSER, supra note
22, § 113, at 769. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A, Comment b (1976). The

question of what is
courts to examine a
the plaintiff's point
action. See Wheeler

encompassed within the single integrated publication has compelled the
wide variety of factual circumstances. The issue is an important one from
of view since a republication of the libel will support another cause of
v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 577A, Comment d (the single publication does not encompass

separate aggregate publications made at different times so that the publication of a defamatory
passage in a morning and an evening edition of a newspaper gives rise to two distinct causes of
action).
In Dodd v. Harper & Bros., 3 App. Div. 2d 548, 162 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1957), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 958, 175 N.Y.S.2d 826, 151 N.E.2d 622 (1958), the court considered the reprinting of an allegedly libelous magazine article and concluded that the reprinting, consisting of
approximately 25,000 copies, was an independent publication of the libelous statements. As
such, the plaintiff's action, brought within the statutory limitation period from the date of the
reprinting, was viable even though the statute of limitations had run on the original publication.
3 App. Div. 2d at 549, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 421. The court declared that the reprinted copies, as a
whole, constituted a single publication upon which the statute of limitations would begin to run.
id.
Among the communications considered to be included in the single publication are miscellaneous copies of a magazine mailed after the original publication, Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334
I11. App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1948); replacement copies forwarded to subscribers, Backus v.
Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); and late sales made from a newsstand, Means v.
MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
1 Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 124, 81 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1948); see W.
PROSSER, supra note 22, § 113, at 769.
52 Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 65, 78 N.E.2d 708, 710-11 (1948); see note 50
supra.
53 See Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A, Comment d (1976).
54 Ogden v. Association of United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1959);
Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (1938),
aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939).
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An early case in which the single publication rule was utilized
with respect to the statute of limitations was Wolfson v. Syracuse
Newspapers, Inc. 5 5 In Wolfson, the plaintiff's libel action, based
upon the publication of a defamatory article and editorial in the defendant's newspaper, was admittedly barred by the statute of limitations. 56 The defendant, however, operated a library in which past issues
of the newspaper, including the allegedly libelous issue, were retained
for public inspection. 57 In an amended complaint, the plaintiff asserted that a third party, with the defendant's permission, had
examined the libelous issue two months prior to the filing of the suit
and that this act constituted a republication of the libel. 5 8 Noting
that the plaintiff's claim was evidently an attempt to circumvent the
statute of limitations, the court declared that there was but one publication when the libelous article appeared in the newspaper. 5 9 In
the opinion of the court, this act of publication occurred, and the
cause of action accrued, at the time of the original issue and the statute of limitations commenced to run at that time. 60 In reaching this
conclusion, the court determined that the plaintiff's employment of
the classic multiple publication approach was unacceptable in that it
permitted a defamed party to nullify the policies underlying the statute of limitations. 61
11 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1938), aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d
676 (1939).
" 254 App. Div. at 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
57 Id. at 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
at 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
at 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The dissent insisted that the common law rule as proclaimed in Duke of Brunswick was dispositive of the controversy. Id. at 214, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
60 Id.
at 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
at 213, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 643. In so holding, the Wolfson court stated that
651 Id.
55 Id.
59 Id.

[i]f the bar of the Statute of Limitations can be lifted by means such as plaintiff
now seeks to employ, we may no longer term it a "statute of repose" which makes
effective a purpose which the Legislature has conceived to be imperative-to out-

law stale claims. .

.

. The rule for which the plaintiff contends would not only per-

mit libel actions against news publishers without limitation as to time but its scope

would extend beyond the field of journalism . . . . [l]f plaintiff's position is correct
in law it must follow that, although a book may have had but one publication
twenty years ago, if the publisher continues to make unsold copies of the single
publication available to the [present public], such conduct amounts to a republication of any libel which the book contains and thereby becomes actionable ....
[S]uch a rule would nullify the clear purpose of the Statue of Limitations ....
Id. at 213, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43 (citations omitted).

The Wolfson court rejected the
libelous issue available to the public
ant's conduct was "passive" in nature
individual to read the alleged libels."

claim that the defendant's act of making old copies of the
constituted a republication by concluding that the defendand lacked "a conscious intent to induce the public or any
Id. at 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 642. The "conscious intent" test,

used to determine whether an act of a publisher can serve as a republication of the libel,
requires that the status of a particular communication should depend on whether it was a "con-
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Notwithstanding the fact that the Wolfson court articulated the
single publication rule in the context of a libel communicated in a
newspaper, the rule was subsequently applied to the area of books.
In Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 6 2 the Court of Appeals of New
York determined that the application of the single publication rule to
the distribution of books was essential in order to effectuate the
policies of the statute of limitations. 6 3 Reiterating the Wolfson
court's concern that the common law rule would prevent the expiration of the statutory period as long as a single copy was available for
public review, 64 the Gregoire court determined that sales from the
publisher's stock of a book embodying defamatory remarks did not
constitute a republication of the libel which could support additional
causes of action. 65 The court then declared that the plaintiff's sole
cause of action arose "when the finished product [was] released by
66
the publisher for sale in accord with trade practice."
scious independent one," and not on the distinctiveness of a specific sale or the lapse of time.
E. SEELMAN, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 130, at 120
(1941). On the plaintiff's appeal, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939), a dissenting judge stated
that the act of the defendant in placing the printed defamation on file for public examination
was not passive in character, but an affirmative act designed to enhance the public good will
toward the defendant's profit-making business. Id. at 721, 18 N.E.2d at 678.
62 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948).
63 Id. at 125, 81 N.E.2d at 48. Judge Desmond, speaking for the dissent, pointed out that
"[u]nlike a newspaper, [a] book may grow in popularity and effectiveness with the passage of
time, with each new sale a fresh and damaging assault on the reputation of the victim." Id. at
127, 81 N.E.2d at 50. As a result, the dissent was of the opinion that the majority had allowed
the "exception [to] swallow the ... rule" by extending the Wolfson rationale to the sale of
books. Id. See also Note, Application of Single Publication Rule to Publisherof Books, 24 IND.
L.J. 279 (1949).
64 298 N.Y. at 125, 81 N.E.2d at 48-49.
65 Id. at 126, 81 N.E.2d at 49.
66 Id. While it is well settled that the statutory limitation period begins to run from the date
of publication, there remains some dispute as to precisely when the moment of legal publication
occurs. See, e.g., Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727, 733 (2d Cir. 1963) (publication occurs on date the material went on sale to the general public at the nation's newsstands);
Khaury v. Playboy Publications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1342, 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (publication
takes place when substantially all of the matter has been distributed to the public); Osmers v.
Parade Publications, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (legal publication date is date
on which the libel was 'communicated to mass of readers for whom it was intended); Backus v.
Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (publication occurs on date the material is
delivered to common carrier for shipment to news dealers and copies are mailed to subscribers).
Since the period of limitation for libel actions is particularly brief, see note 44 supra, the selection of this point in time is of crucial import. The failure of the courts to agree on a uniform
point of legal publication has been a ground for criticism of the single publication rule. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 407, 512 P.2d 702, 705 (1973); see Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 9.
The dispute as to the date of legal publication has also generated the "statute of limitations
trap." Leflar, supra note 35, at 271-75. This "trap" occurs when a defamed plaintiff institutes
his suit in reliance on the material's cover date. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, however, the
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The single publication rule has been firmly established as the
prevailing doctrine among the American 'courts. 6 7 Furthermore, in
addition to receiving the support of legal commentators, 68 the rule
has been accepted by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws which has endorsed the Uniform Single Publication

courts have often found that the act of legal publication occurred prior to the date appearing on
the magazine cover. Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. I11. 1945),
aff'd, 187 F.2d 180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 814 (1951); Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
67 Ogden v. Association of United States Army, 177 F. Supp. 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1959); see,
e.g., Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1963) (administering
New York law); Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 299 F.2d
212, 214 (2d Cir. 1962) (administering New York law); Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300
F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1962) (administering Illinois law prior to adoption of the Uniform Single
Publication Act); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 134-35 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 838 (1948) (administering Illinois law); Akin v. Time, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 306, 306-08
(N.D. Ala. 1966) (administering Alabama law); Tocco v. Time, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 410, 413-14
(E.D. Mich. 1961) (administering Michigan law); Cassius v. Mortimer, 161 F. Supp. 74, 75-76
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1958) (administering New York law); Hazlitt v.
Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 539 (D. Conn. 1953) (administering Oklahoma
law); Fouts v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F.Supp. 535, 537 (D. Conn. 1953) (administering
Kansas law); Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F.Supp. 527, 529 (D. Conn. 1953) (administering Connecticut law); Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500, 504 (M.D. Pa. 1951)
(administering Pennsylvania law prior to adoption of the Uniform Single Publication Act); Polchlopek v. American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309, 310 (D. Mass. 1947) (administering Massachusetts law); Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(administering New York law); Belli v. Roberts Bros. Furs, 240 Cal. App. 2d 284, 285, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 625, 627-29 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 I11.App. 59, 72, 78 N.E.2d
708, 714 (App. Ct. 1948); Forman v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 107, 14 So.2d
344, 347 (1943); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211. 212, 4 N.Y.S.2d
640, 642 (1938), aff'd per curiam, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939); Dominiak v. National
Enquirer, 439 Pa. 222, 226-27, 266 A.2d 626, 629-30 (1970); Applewhite v. Memphis State
Univ., 495 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tenn. 1973).
While the majority of states which have adopted the single publication rule have done so as
a matter of common law, several states have seen fit to enact single publication statutes. See
note 70 infra. Lastly, at least one state continues to adhere to the common law rule of multiple
publication. Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 409, 512 P.2d 702, 706 (1973).
88 A provision incorporating the principles of the single publication rule has been proposed
by the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single
publication.
(4) As to any single publication,
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action;
and
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for
damages bars any other action for damages between the same parties in all jurisdic-

tions.
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Act. 6 9 This act has been adopted in several states and the Panama
Canal Zone.

70

In Barres, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was given the opportunity to enunciate which publication standard would be adopted
in the state. Rejecting the plaintiff's contentions that each sale of an
allegedly libelous book constituted a publication within the meaning
of the statute of limitations, 71 the court opted for the single publication rule. 7 2 Finding that any inadequacies inherent in the single
publication rule could be dealt with effectively under existing state
law, the court determined that "the principles which underlie the
single publication rule are in accord with the public policies of this
73
State."
The Barres court, following the rationale of Gregoire, concluded
that the requisite act of publication occurred no later than November
15, 1971, the date the book was released to the public in accordance
with established trade practice. 74 Pursuant to the single publication
69 In 1952, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association endorsed the Uniform Single Publication Act, 13 U.L.A. CIvIL PROC.
AND REM. LAws 517 (1975). The act provides:

§ 1. No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel
or slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publication. . . , such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or magazine or any one
presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio or television or any one
exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action shall include all damages for
any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all jurisdictions.
§ 2. A judgment in any jurisdiction for or against the plaintiff upon the substantive merits of any action for damages founded upon a single publication ...
shall bar any other action for damages by the same plaintiff against the same
defendant founded upon the same publication ....
Id. at 519, 521.
70 ARtZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-651 (West 1956); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3425.1 to .5 (West 1970);
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-702 to -705 (1978 Cum. Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 126, §§ 11-15 (Smith-

Hurd 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-27-30 to -35 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-10 (1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

§§

2090.1 to .5 (Purdon 1967); C.Z. CODE tit. 4, §§ 4891-4895 (1962).

7 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 4; see note 10 supra.
72 131 N.J. Super. at 390, 330 A.2d at 50. The specific issue the court was asked to resolve
was "when does the period of limitation commence to run on a libelous statement made in a
book distributed in many states on a general release date where the publisher thereafter sells
copies of such book for several years." Id. at 374, 330 A.2d at 40.
73 Id. at 390, 330 A.2d at 50.
74 Id. at 376-77, 330 A.2d at 41; accord, Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119,
126, 81 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1948).
In Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1963), the plaintiff asserted
that he had been libeled by an article published in the defendant's magazine. Id. at 728. While
evaluating the choice of law repercussions of a libel distributed in numerous states, the court
concluded that, in the absence of New Jersey case law on the question, a cause of action based
on a defamatory publication accrued no earlier than the date on which the magazine went on
sale to the public at newsstands throughout the United States. Id. at 735: see Johnson v. Asbury
Park Press, Inc., 14 N.J. Misc. 282, 285, 184 A. 518, 520 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 117 N.J.L.
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rule, the one year statute of limitations commenced to run on that
75
date, thereby barring the plaintiff's suit.
Articulating its apprehension with the multiple publication rule
and the fact that its application would enable the plaintiff to institute
an action based on each individual sale occurring within one year of
the commencement of the suit, 76 the majority evaluated the repercussions each rule would have on various state policies. Initially, the
majority ascertained that the single publication rule was in accord
with the legislative determination that a brief period of limitations is
preferable when dealing with the tort of libel. 77 The publisher had
contended that adherence to this rule was mandated by the need to
insure repose to publishers within a definite length of time from the
general release date. 78 Endorsing this contention, the majority disparaged the multiple publication rule for undermining the statutes of
limitations as "statutes of repose." 79 Noting that these statutes were
533, 189 A. 381 (Ct. Err. & App. 1937) (a cause of action accrued on the date a defamatory
article appeared in a newspaper).
'5 131 N.J. Super. at 393-94, 330 A.2d at 51. see note 10 supra. The partial summary
judgment was granted only as to the plaintiff's claim for damages. Id. It was, however, without
prejudice to the plaintiff attempting to obtain equitable relief, in the form of an injunction,
should he receive a judgment against the defaulting author. Id. at 393-94, 330 A.2d at 51-52;
see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
76 Id. at 379, 330 A.2d at 42. A rigorous application of the multiple publication rule would
enable Barres to institute an action for each book sold on or after June 1, 1973. Id. The sales for
that period totalled approximately 1,800 copies. 74 N.J. at 461, 378 A.2d at 1148.
77 131 N.J. Super. at 387, 330 A.2d at 48; see Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note
13, at 12.
78 Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 13, at 7.
7 131 N.J. Super. at 380, 330 A.2d at 43 (quoting Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298
N.Y. 119, 123, 81 N.E.2d 45, 47 (1948)).
The courts of New Jersey have frequently observed that the statute of limitations embodies
the significant public policies of compelling litigants to pursue their actions diligently, of sheltering defendants from stale claims, and of ensuring the efficient operation of the judicial process through the elimination of time-worn actions. Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp.,
62 N.J. 111, 115, 299 A.2d 394, 396 (1973); State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 295, 74 A.2d
565, 571 (1950); see note 47 supra. Although such statutes were initially treated with disdain,
the current tenor of the courts is to recognize their worthwhile objectives and to enforce them.
M'Cluny v. Selliman, 28 U.S. 270, 278 (1830); accord, Eureka Printing Co. v. Division of
Employment Security, 21 N.J. 383, 387, 122 A.2d 345, 347 (1956).
In Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945), the Court concluded that the
function of the statute of limitations was to "spare . . . the citizen from being put to his defense
after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost."
Id. at 314. It has been resolutely argued that the policies contained in the statute of limitations,
as articulated by the Court in Chase, fail to provide support for the adoption of the single
publication rule. See Note, The Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62
HAR\V. L. RE'. 1041, 1044 (1949). Proponents of this argument contend that the courts, in the
absence of the single publication rule, would grant viability only to those publications occurring
within the statutory limitation period preceding the suit. Id. Recovery for a publication occurring prior to that period, clearly within the ambit of the remarks of the Chase Court, would be
permanently disallowed. Id.
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designed to shelter the courts and the parties from the litigation of
stale claims, the court observed that the older rule would prevent the
expiration of the limitation period as long as a single copy of the
libelous matter was capable of being sold or examined. 8 0 In justifying its reluctance to distinguish between the publication of libelous
comments contained in a book and those appearing in a newspaper or
magazine, the majority concurred with the Gregoire determination
that the undesirable consequence of an unexpiring limitation period
would arise in both situations."'
Furthermore, the majority opined that the principles of the
single publication rule are in keeping with the policy reflected in the
court's provision for permissive joinder.8 2 The majority observed
that the judiciary's desire to consolidate all of a plaintiff's libel claims
was a major impetus in the development of the single publication
rule.8 3 This judicial concern, the majority posited, is equally present
in the provision which permits a plaintiff to join all of his claims
against a party into one suit since both are premised on the need to
spare the court and the parties the inconvenience and injustice of
8 4
endless litigation.
Justice Schreiber, author of the dissenting opinion, questioned
the willingness of the majority to base its holding upon the policies
underlying the statute of limitations and the joinder provision. As to
the need for effectuating the purposes of the statute of limitations the
dissent observed that in 1934, the year in which the legislature
enacted the statute of limitations for libel, it was well-settled that
each communication of defamatory material to a third person constituted a publication which could support a cause of action.8 5 As a
result, a plaintiff defamed in a written work was required to institute
his suit within the brief statutory period which commenced on the
date of the publication of each libel, and not on the date of the general release.8 6 This rationale effectively rendered the publisher of a
131 N.J. Super. at 381, 330 A.2d at 44.
8 See id. at 380-81, 330 A.2d at 43-44.
82 Id. at 387-88, 330 A.2d at 48. The provision regarding the permissive joinder of claims,
N.J.R. 4:27-1, states that "[t]he plaintiff in his complaint . . . and the defendant in an answer
...may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims, either legal or equitable or both, as he may have against an opposing party." Id. Implicit in this provision is the
desire to adjudicate all of the controversies between the same litigants in a single action in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits. See Ertag v. Haines, 30 N.J. Super. 225, 228, 104 A.2d 81,
83 (Law Div. 1954).
" 131 N.J. Super. at 379, 330 A.2d at 43; see Ogden v. Association of United States Army,
177 F. Supp. 498, 500 (D.D.C. 1959).
14 131 N.J. Super. at 387-88, 330 A.2d at 48.
85 74 N.J. at 463-64, 378 A.2d at 1149.
" See id. at 464, 378 A.2d at 1149.
00
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defamation accountable for each act of publication, while restricting
recoverable damages to those occurring within the statutory limitation
87
period.
Declaring that the majority had failed to offer any "sound reason"
for its holding relative to the statute of limitations, Justice Schreiber
criticized the rule as an unjustified modification of the legislature's
enactment.8 8 While conceding that adherence to the multiple publication rule could result in extended periods of potential publisher
liability, the dissent maintained such a consequence would only occur
when the publisher continued to disseminate the defamatory matter. 8 9 Stating that a fundamental objective of the statute of limitations is to avert the litigation of time-worn claims and "not, through
[the] application of collateral legal fictions, to extinguish those that
are viable," 90 the dissent felt compelled to reject a rule which would
enable a wrongful publisher to circulate a libelous book subsequent to
a judicial determination of its content. 9 1
Additionally, Justice Schreiber was dissatisfied with the majority's finding that the principles of the single publication rule were in
harmony with the policy of the permissive joinder provision. 9 2
Labelling the majority's dependence upon the joinder rule as "somewhat misplaced," 9 3 the dissent suggested that the court employ "the
equitable doctrine of preventing a multiplicity of actions." 94 Submitting that it was this doctrine, and not the single publication rule,

87 See id.

11 id. This displeasure with a judicial adoption of the single publication rule was
foreshadowed by Judge Desmond's dissenting opinion in Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298
N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.2d 45 (1948), where he stated that
[t]here cannot be the slightest basis for suggesting that the Legislature, when it
fixed a one-year period within which libel suits must be brought, had any possible
idea that this would be interpreted as meaning one year from the date when the
first copy of the book was sent out into the world by the publisher. If the Legislature wants that to be the law . . . [it] should be permitted to say so.
Id. at 128, 81 N.E.2d at 50.
89 74 N.J. at 464, 378 A.2d at 1149.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 464-67, 378 A.2d at 1149-51. while the objections of Justice Schreiber are
well taken, it should be remembered that the plaintiff did have the opportunity to institute his
suit against the publisher during the year following the well-publicized release of the allegedly
libelous book. Additionally, it is irrefutable that the statute of limitations frequently serves to
bar the litigation of just claims.
92 Id. at 464-66, 378 A.2d at 1149-50.
93 Id. at 463, 378 A.2d at 1149.
94 Id. The dissent referred to the fine discussion of the single publication rule in Note, The
Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1949). The
author of that note posited that the single publication "fiction," originally developed to shield
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which was consonant with the permissive joindef provisions, Justice
Schreiber observed that the use of the equitable principle would limit
the plaintiff to a single suit based on distributed copies of a libelous
book. 95 Such an application, the dissent contended, found additional
support in the court's mandatory "single controversy principle" which
is designed to determine the issues and dispose of the entire controversy in a single proceeding. 96 The crucial distinction between
the majority's utilization of the single publication rule and Justice
Schreiber's approach is that while both rationales would only permit a
plaintiff to bring one action for completed distributions of a libelous
book, Justice Schreiber's view would not preclude the institution of a
single suit joining all viable claims simply because the statutory
97
period had run from the date of the initial publication.
While endorsing the single publication rule, the Barres majority
was not unmindful of the staunch judicial criticism it has provoked.

the courts from a multiplicity of suits, lost some of its basic justification when the courts extended it for use with the statute of limitations. Id. at 1042-46. As such, he challenged this
expansion of the scope of the rule, particularly in light of the other available means by which
the court could protect the defendant from the harassment of multiple suits. Id. at 1044. Upon
a review of the various alternatives, it was suggested that the traditional principles of res
judicata be utilized in conjunction with the multiple publication rule. Id. at 1045-46. Under
this approach, a plaintiff would be required to include all of his actions based on publications
made prior to the suit in a single suit. Id. at 1045; see notes 42-43 supra and accompanying
text. The court would be empowered to award damages not only for distributions made prior to
trial, but also for any future distribution which could reasonably be anticipated in the ordinary
course of business. Note, supra at 1045. The resulting judgment would serve to bar the plaintiff
from instituting additional suits based upon subsequent publications made by the publisher
which could be anticipated. Id. at 1045-46. Additional causes of action could arise only if the
publisher acted in a manner which could not be reasonably foreseen. Id. at 1046. The plaintiff
in Barres urged the court to implement this approach. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note
1, at 13-14; accord, Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 408, 512 P.2d 702, 706
(1973).
95 74 N.J. at 465, 378 A.2d at 1150: see notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
96 74 N.J. at 465, 378 A.2d at 1150. The "single controversy" rule mandates that a plaintiff
seek complete relief for his claims and that a defendant assert any matter which can shield him
from such claims. Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J. 483, 485, 103 A.2d 9, 10, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 835 (1954). In Silverstein v. Abco Vending Serv., 37 N.J. Super. 439, 117 A.2d 527 (App.
Div. 1955), the court commented that "there remains no basis to misapprehend that the courts
of this state are determined to enforce the prime aim of the new practice for . . . the just and
expeditious determination in a single action of the ultimate merits of an entire controversy
between litigants.' " Id. at 449, 117 A.2d at 532 (quoting in part Ajamian v. Schlanger, 14 N.J.
483, 485, 103 A.2d 9, 10 (1954) (emphasis in original)). In essence, this rule means that "the
new unit of litigation is the 'entire controversy,' rather than its constituent causes of action, and
that within the area of this new unit, the joinder of claims is compulsory, under penalty of
forfeiture." Schnitzer, Civil Practice and Procedure, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 307, 334 (1954) (footnote omitted).
97 See 74 N.J. at 466, 378 A.2d at 1150.
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At least one court has rejected the rule for what that court considered
to be its adverse effect on the jurisdiction of the court and the selection of applicable state law in the case of a multi-state libel. 98 These
effects result from the notion that the rule not only determines when
the article was published for statute of limitations purposes, but also
restricts the action to a single jurisdiction by establishing where the
tort occurs. 9 9 Another ground for rejecting the rule is that it encourages a publisher to manipulate the statute of limitations in order to
construct a defense. 10 0 Referred to in numerous opinions, 10 1 this
hypothetical character would either print and disseminate libelous
reading matter far from the domicile of the defamed party or would
limit his local distribution to a miniscule amount. The plaintiff, due to
the misguided belief that the damage to his reputation does not justify the time and expense associated with the litigation of a defamation claim, may refrain from instituting a suit. Once the period of

"8

Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 512 P.2d 702 (1973). In Lewis, the question, as stated upon certification from a federal district court, was whether the state would adopt
the single publication rule "for purposes of determining the situs and time of the tort." Id. at
402, 512 P.2d at 703. The plaintiff, a resident of Montana, instituted his suit against the publishers of a defamatory article. Id. at 402-03, 512 P.2d at 703. The publishers were Delaware
corporations which had no relationship with the plaintiff's domicile state save the fact that the
magazine was distributed there. Id. at 403, 512 P.2d at 703. The federal court had decided that
the application of the multiple publication rule would find that the plaintiff's cause of action
arose with the sale of the libelous matter in Montana. Id. at 404, 512 P.2d at 704. The single
publication rule, in contrast, would hold that the action accrued upon the initial printing of the
article and that the subsequent distribution in Montana would not create an additional cause of
action. Id., accord, Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 632-34
(N.D. 11.),
aff'd, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960) (distribution of
libelous matter is not tortious conduct within the state). Claiming that the single publication
rule creates more problems than it solves, the Supreme Court of Montana adopted the multiple
publication rule. 162 Mont. at 406-07, 512 P.2d at 704, 706. The court criticized the single
publication rule by finding that its adoption would force the plaintiff to bring his suit in the
state of the initial printing. Id. at 407, 512 P.2d at 705. This would arguably encourage publishers to select states which have favorable libel laws as their bases of operation. Id. The court
also took notice of the divergent views taken by the courts in single publication jurisdictions as
to the precise moment of legal publication. Id. Lastly, the court, not limited in the scope of its
disagreement with the rule, resurrected the possibility of the unscrupulous publisher who
would coordinate his dissemination of the defamatory matter so as to bar any claim by the
plaintiff. Id.; see notes 100-01 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Lewis case,
see Note, Publication of Libel in Montana: Lewis v. Reader's Digest Association, 36 MONT. L.
REV. 120 (1975).
99 Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 632-34 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd,
273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960).
'oo 131 N.J. Super. at 389, 330 A.2d at 49.
'o1See e.g., Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736, 738-39 (W.D. Wis. 1947);
Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 162 Mont. 401, 407, 512 P.2d 702, 705 (1973). See also Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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limitations has expired, thereby barring any cause of action the plaintiff may have possessed, the publisher could effectuate a massive distribution of the same libelous material without fear of liability.
The Barres majority, upon consideration of these justifiable concerns, declared that the harmful consequences of an application of the
rule could be eliminated under present state law. 10 2 As to the uneasiness induced by the possibility that the rule may be utilized to
deprive a plaintiff of his ability to institute a libel suit in his domicile
state, the Barres court followed the reasoning of earlier courts which
determined that the concept of rendering a publication of a libel
complete upon the act of initial publication was appropriate only in
relation to the recognized objectives of the rule.' 0 3 This concept, the
majority maintained, would not be transposed so as to disallow a suit
in the plaintiff's state of residence, especially since the greatest harm
to his reputation would occur in that state. 10 4 This finding was considered to be complemented by the court's position that the long-arm
service rule is restricted only by the guarantees of "due process of
law." 105 In response to the apparition of the unscrupulous publisher, the court stated that a party who acts in such an unreasonable
and deceptive manner would be prohibited, through the employment
of the equitable doctrine of estoppel, from availing himself of the stat-

131 N.J. Super. at 390, 330 A.2d at 50.
Id. at 389-90, 330 A.2d at 49; accord, Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175
(2d Cir. 1967).
In Buckley, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly rejected the holding of
the Insull court as to the use of the single publication rule for determining where the tort
occurred. Id. The Buckley court determined that the defendant's act of distributing thousands of
copies of a libelous editorial constituted "tortious conduct [within the] state" so as to subject the
publisher to the court's "long arm" jurisdictional statute. Id. at 177, 179-80. In finding for the
plaintiff, the court commented that
[eliliptical statements that a libel by newspaper is "complete" upon publication,
though often accurate enough in their particular context, should not obscure that
the purpose of the single publication rule is not to deprive a plaintiff defamed in
another state of the privilege to sue there which the legislature had granted generally to persons injured by wrongful conduct within its borders, but rather to protect
the defendant-and the courts-from a multiplicity of suits, an almost endless tolling of the statute of limitations, and diversity in applicable substantive law.
Id.; see Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 319 (10th Cir. 1977) (the single publication
rule does not relate to the issue of personal jurisdiction and the use of the rule to limit a
plaintiff to a particular forum is a "distortion").
10' 131 N.J. Super. at 389-90, 330 A.2d at 49.
105 Id. The court observed that the supreme court has construed the state's long arm rule,
N.J.R. 4:4-1, liberally so as to expand its jurisdictional scope. Id. at 389, 330 A.2d at 49. This
approach enables the courts to permit service on a nonresident defendant "subject only to 'due
process of law.' " Id. (quoting Avdell Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268, 277 A.2d 207, 209
(1971)). Described rather simply, "anything any state can do under the Federal Constitution
102
103
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ute of limitations defense.' 0 6 In so determining, the court mandated
that the publisher abide by normal trade practices in releasing the
07
controversial material. 1
In administering the single publication rule, the court determined that the publisher had acted within the ambit of established
trade practices at all times with regard to the printing and distribution of the book. 10 8 Consequently, the plaintiff's action based upon
passages in the book was barred by the statute of limitations. 10 9
[New Jersey] can do." Roland v. Modell's Shoppers World of Bergen County, Inc., 92 N.J.
Super. 1, 7, 222 A.2d 110, 113 (App. Div. 1966); see Reilly v. P.J. Wolff & Sohne, 374 F.
Supp. 775, 776-77 (D.N.J. 1974). Due process in the sense used by the courts above
is coextensive with fundamental notions of fairness and demands only that the extent and nature of defendant's contacts in or with this State . . .be sufficient, under
the circumstances of the controversy and as a matter of substantial justice and fair
play, to justify the exercise of extraterritorial judicial power by this state.
Egan v. Fieldhouse, 139 N.J. Super. 220, 223, 353 A.2d 148, 149 (Law Div. 1976).
The decision of whether to employ the single publication rule can have conflict of laws
ramifications " 'of almost incredible complexity.' " Zuck v. Interstate Publishing Corp., 317 F.2d
727, 733 (2d Cir. 1963) (quoting 1 A. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.16 (1956)).
The Barres court, with the full agreement of both parties, determined that the law of New
Jersey was controlling. 131 N.J. Super. at 377 n.2, 330 A.2d at 41 n.2. The court utilized the
governmental interest analysis and concluded that no other state had a more substantial interest
in the plaintiff's suit than New Jersey. Id.; see System Operations v. Scientific Games Dev.
Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977). While the court gave limited consideration to the
conflict of laws implications of this case, it did note that a compatible analysis has been recommended by the drafters of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 150 (1971),
which provides:
(1) The rights and liabilities that arise from defamatory matter in any one edition of
a book or newspaper .. . or similar aggregate communication are determined by
the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties ...
(2) When a natural person claims that he has been defamed by an aggregate communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be the state where
the person was domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of was published in
that state.
Id. For an extensive discussion on conflict of laws, see Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH.
L. REV. 959 (1953).
106131 N.J. Super. at 390, 330 A.2d at 49-50. Deceptive conduct, such as that put forth in
the court's hypothetical, has frequently induced the court to disallow the utilization of the statute of limitations. See Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450, 173 A.2d 277, 285-86 (1961); State
v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341, 359, 126 A.2d 168, 178 (1956); Partrick v. Groves,
115 N.J. Eq. 208, 210, 169 A. 701, 702 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934); Friedman v. Friendly Ice
Cream Co., 133 N.J. Super. 333, 338, 336 A.2d 493, 495 (App. Div. 1975). The plaintiff in
Barres had a particularly difficult time trying to persuade the court to consider this criticism in
light of the defendant's assertion that the publication of No Cause for Indictment was well-publicized and that 3,372 copies out of a total of 8,500 copies were sold within one and one-half
months of the general .public release date. See Brief of Defendant-Respondent, supra note 13,
at 16.
107 131 N.J. Super. at 390, 330 A.2d at 49-50.
108 Id. at 390, 330 A.2d at 50.
109 Id. at 393-94, 330 A.2d at 51.
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Furthermore, the court decided that the additional copies, printed
after the initial order, were encompassed within the plaintiff's single
cause of action 110 and, as such, any action based upon them was also
barred. 1 ' This determination was premised upon the court's finding
that the scope of the single cause of action should be defined in terms
of "production runs that are related to the general release date." 112
Upon examination of the activities of the publisher in Barres, the
court found that the supplementary printing was "sufficiently close"
to the initial printing so as to be considered part of a single publishing act.113 Moreover, characterizing the publisher's bulk sale to a
remainder outlet as motivated by "a recognition ... that the book
had in that form come to the end of its circulation," 1 14 the court

declined to find that the activities of the publisher produced a republication of the libel. 1 15 The plaintiff strongly asserted that this
reasoning, in essence, permitted the publisher to benefit from the
fact that it was not earning profits on the book at the time of the bulk
sale. 116 The court, however, recognized that the present situation
dealt with the sale of excess copies of a previously printed book and
was distinguishable from holdings which have found reprintings to
constitute republication." 7 The court no doubt realized that the
plaintiff, upon the commencement of a timely suit, could recover
damages based on all sales made prior to trial, as well as those which
could reasonably be expected to occur." 18
A peculiar factual development compelled the Barres court to
scrutinize the consequences of its holding barring the plaintiff's collection of damages from the publisher. Due to the default of the author, the plaintiff had the opportunity to establish the libelous nature
of the passage and obtain a judgment in his proof action. 1 9 The
majority observed that the present holding protecting the publisher
from the plaintiff's suit would enable the publisher to continue the
unhindered dissemination of the libelous reading matter. 1 20
110Id. at 390-91, 330 A.2d at 50.
"I' Id. at 393-94, 330 A.2d at 51.
Id. at 385, 330 A.2d at 46; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577, Comments c

112

and d (1976).
113 131 N.J. Super. at 390-91, 330 A.2d at 50.
114 Id. at 391, 330 A.2d at 50.
115 Id.
116 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 1, at 19-20.
117

See 131 N.J. Super. at 387, 330 A.2d at 48.

118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A, Comment e (1976); see Brief of Defendant-

Respondent, supra note 13, at 19.
119 131 N.J. Super. at 391, 330 A.2d at 50; see note 13 supra.
120 131 N.J. Super. at 387, 330 A.2d at 48.
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Acknowledging that there has long been a hesitancy among the courts
to resort to the employment of injunctions when dealing with a
speech exercise, 121 the court pronounced that the utilization of this
equitable instrument is appropriate once the libelous character of the
communication has been established. 122 The court maintained that
the issuance of an injunction is particularly effective in this area since
it serves to shelter the reputation of the defamed party from future
defilement in addition to shielding the courts from unnecessary litiga121 The courts have frequently pronounced that various classes of speech are not within the
realm of first amendment protection. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). It is
quite clear that the right of an individual to express himself freely, through speech or press,
does not justify the publication of a libel. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942).
122 See 131 N.J. Super. at 391-94, 330 A.2d at 50-52.
In England, the Court of Star Chamber often granted injunctive relief so as to restrain the
publication of libelous material. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. 1839). The courts
in this country, however, have usually declined to issue injunctions to prevent the distribution
of such material. Devine v. Devine, 20 N.J. Super. 522, 528, 90 A.2d 126, 129 (Ch. Div. 1952);
Weiss v. Levine, 133 N.J. Eq. 441, 445, 32 A.2d 574, 576 (Ch. Div. 1943); A. Hollander &
Son, Inc. v. Jos. Hollander, Inc., 117 N.J. Eq. 578, 583, 177 A. 80, 82 (Ch. Div. 1935). The
reluctance of the courts as to the issuance of injunctions in this area can basically be traced to
four concerns.
Traditionally, equity would only protect property rights as opposed to personal rights. See
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640
(1916). As Justice Schreiber noted, the protection of one's reputation is now considered a sufficiently important purpose so as to justify the protection afforded by this equitable device. 74
N.J. at 466, 378 A.2d at 1150; see Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 919, 67 A. 97, 100
(Ct. Err. & App. 1907). See generally Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 147, 148-51 (1964). Secondly, it was believed the issuance of an injunction would
deprive a defendant of his right to have a jury evaluate the truthful nature of the alleged libel.
131 N.J. Super. at 392, 330 A.2d at 50. Thirdly, the courts gave great weight to the view that
the remedy of an injunction should not be granted where there exists an adequate remedy at
law. See Town of Montclair v. Kip, 110 N.J. Eq. 506, 509, 160 A. 677, 679 (Ch. Div., 1932). It
was generally held that the remedies provided at law, namely that the plaintiff could institute a
suit for damages based on any injury arising from the libelous publication and that potential
criminal prosecution was available in some circumstances, were sufficient to recompense the
defamed party. Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W.Va. 497, 508, 81 S.E.2d 237, 243 (1954). Lastly, the
courts were deeply concerned with the contention of defendants that an injunction against publication of printed matter is unconstitutional as a prior restraint on free expression. Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Snpp, 978, 984 (D. Ore. 1963); Mazzocone v. Willing, 246 Pa.
Super. Ct. 98, 102-03, 369 A.2d 829, 832-33 (1976). This concern was premised upon a realization that "[t]he special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed,
either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
The courts ultimately developed a willingness to enjoin the publication of defamatory material once that same material had been adjudged libelous. O'Brien v. University Community
Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St. 2d 242, 245, 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1975); cf. Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437, 445 (1957) (court found statute authorizing state officer to
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tion. 123 The need to examine equitable relief was considered to be
essential under conditions such as Barres where a stockpile of several
hundred copies of the book existed and could conceivably be available
for circulation for years to come. 124 This holding would enable the
lower court to enjoin the further dissemination of No Cause For Indictment once the passage had been adjudged libelous. While leaving
for future courts the responsibility of defining the precise role injunctive relief should play under the Barres facts, the court did expressly
direct that the determination as to the appropriateness of equitable
relief should "achieve a result consistent with any adjudication pertaining to [the] author." 125 The court added, however, that the
plaintiff's need for an injunction must be balanced with the general
rule that equity follows the law and will decline to grant relief where
126
an action at law is unavailable.
The Barres decision exhibits a recognition that a flexible approach is indispensible to the just adjudication of a libel action. It was
manifest from the outset that neither the majority nor the dissent
could give countenance to the unqualified application of the multiple
publication rule since to do so would be to condemn both the publishing industry and the judicial system to a disastrous overload of
libel litigation. The qualification employed by the dissenting Justice

invoke "limited injunction remedy," under closely defined procedural safeguards, against distribution of printed matter determined to be obscene not violative of right of free speech). The
determination that the material is in fact libelous must occur prior to the imposition of any
restraints by the court. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967).
123 131 N.J. Super. at 391-93, 330 A.2d at 50-51; see Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 411-12,
184 S.W. 1139, 142 (Sup. Ct. 1916 (court may enjoin continued publication of material found
to be libelous so as to avoid multiplicity of suits).
124 131 N.J. Super. at 393, 330 A.2d at 51.
Ild. at 394, 330 A.2d at 52. Such a result would arguably be immune to Judge Desmond's
claim in Gregoire that the single publication rule gave the publisher "a license for continued
wrongdoing." Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. at 129, 81 N.E.2d at 51.
It should be observed that the opinion of Justice Schreiber in Barres included an evaluation of the proper role of injunctive relief. Concurring with the majority's finding that the
concerns of censorship of a speech or press exercise are not present once the libel has been
judicially established, the dissent endorsed the use of equitable relief to prohibit the continued
circulation of the material. 74 N.J. at 466-67, 378 A.2d at 1150. This instrument, in conjunction
with the equitable principle of preventing multiplicity of actions, could be employed so as to
resolve the entire controversy between the parties based on past publications, as well as to
prevent the publisher from engaging in further distribution of identical material. See id.
12 131 N.J. Super. at 394-95, 330 A.2d at 52; accord, Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S.
182, 192 (1893). But see Giberson v. First Nat'l Bank of Spring Lake, 100 N.J. Eq. 502, 507,
136 A. 323, 325 (Ch. Div. 1927). The Barres court also observed that "courts of equity frequently refuse relief where it appears that the complainant has delayed seeking the aid of the
court for a period comparable to the one appearing in the statute of limitations." 131 N.J.
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Schreiber was the equitable doctrine which compels a plaintiff de27
famed by a mass libel to join all of his claims into a single suit. 1
While the solution proffered by the dissenters effectively deals
with the multiple suits problem, it remains burdened with the unacceptable fact that its application undermines the purpose of the statute of limitations. Not only would the statute of limitations never
expire as long as a copy of the libelous material is available for sale,
but the plaintiff would be given the capacity to delay the filing of his
complaint until irreplaceable elements of the publisher's proposed
defense have become unprocurable. While the claim that this situation could only occur if the publisher continues to disseminate the
defamatory matter is a valid one, the prospect of permitting a libel
suit to be brought decades after the general release of the. book simply because a single copy, has remained marketable is an unpleasant
one at best. The assertion that the policies embodied within the statute of limitations are being protected by limiting the damages the
plaintiff may recover to those occurring within one year of the commencement of his single suit, although superficially appealing, is
equally unpersuasive. Since the viable publication under this
rationale must have occurred within the statutory period, the concerns over unavailable witnesses and destroyed evidence resulting
from the mere passage of time are minimized, The allegedly libelous
statement contained in these publications, however, may very often
deal with an event which transpired in the distant past. A defense
such as truth could rely very heavily upon a detailed account of the
factual circumstances surrounding such events. As a result, while the
concerns of the courts as to the proof of printing and distribution may
be alleviated by this approach, the argument continues to adversely
affect the publisher through other facets of the statute of limitations.
The Barres court further demonstrated flexibility through its responses to the usual criticisms of the single publication rule. The
court determined that the rule would not be permitted to impair an
individual's ability to institute a suit in his domicile state. In addition,
the court has established sufficient safeguards against a publisher
employing the bar of the statute of limitations, through the manipulation of his printing and distribution schedule, by mandating that the
release of the material be completed " 'in accord[ance] with trade

Super. at 394-95, 330 A.2d at 52 (quoting 2 J.
ed. 1941)).
127 74 N.J. at 467-68, 378 A.2d at 1151.
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practice.' "128 Consequently, for a publisher to be eligible to raise
the statute of limitations defense, he must meet the standards developed by the ethical segments of the communications indtistry.
The court's interpretation of the scope of the single publication of
a defamatory book will enable future courts to dispose of libel claims
with a minimum of litigation. The decision in Barres, by viewing the
129
publication of reading matter in terms of related production runs,
has provided the courts with the authority to determine if different
units of material are associated to such a degree so as to justify treating them as a single act of publication. Lastly, by ratifying the use of
injunctive relief in cases where "appropriate to complete the relief
envisioned by those developing the rule," 130 the court accomplished
the objective of preventing future publication of identical material
which would injure the defamed and overburden the courts.
The Barres decision, one made "in the light of the realities of
the century," 131 recognizes that the single publication rule is a
mechanism by which a court can justly balance the rights and interests of the defamed and the defamer. Through this decision, the supreme court has furnished future courts with the conceptual focus to
be employed in evaluating libel actions. It will be for these courts,
however, to administer the Barres guidelines so as to adequately
safeguard a paramount interest of the individual-one's personal
reputation.
Robert Emmett Ryan
128 131 N.J. Super. at 381, 330 A.2d at 44 (quoting Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298
N.Y. 119, 126, 81 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1948)).
129 Id. at 385, 330 A.2d at 46.
130 Id. at 393, 330 A.2d at 51.
131 59 HARV. L. REV. 136, 136 (1945).

